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1. Introduction 
 
Entrepreneurship is a frequently used catchword in industrial policy circles. Entrepreneurship 
is seen to promote job creation, fostering structural change and creating comparative 
advantages. In the tradition of Schumpeter (1912) it is argued that new innovative enterprises 
displace less innovative incumbents, ultimately leading to a higher degree of economic 
growth. Creative industries, in turn, are often considered to be one of the few economic 
sectors beside biotechnology with rosy potentials for growth and employment creation by 
policy makers in the advanced industrialized countries (e.g. EC 1998, Marcus 2005). They 
account roughly for 5% of GNP in most EU countries and have higher growth rates than other 
sectors (EC 1998).1 Moreover, creative industries provide important inputs to other industries, 
e.g. product design or tourism. 
 
The importance of creativity and the interaction and contrast between competition and artistic 
objectives provides an interesting starting point for product innovation. Interestingly, the links 
between creative industries and entrepreneurship is seldom made explicit, and if, then only 
sketchy. And indeed, there is not much knowledge about processes of entry and exit and of 
creative destruction in creative industries. Most studies concentrate on the part of the arts 
sector which are essentially non-profit in nature and considered to be fragile natural 
monopolies characterized by high fixed costs and a limited willingness to pay due to a limited 
audience. For instance, Kuan (2001 p 510) considers the performing arts as “monopolies 
teetering on the edge of bankruptcy.” On the other hand there are a number of competitive 
industries, for example the media industries or advertising, which are included in the category 
of creative industries.   
 
This paper uses an industrial organization perspective. The paper is organized as follows. The 
next chapter provides a definition of the industries which are grouped together under the 
heading of cultural or creative industries. A short history of the term of cultural and creative 
industries is presented which shows that the creation of these terms was prevalently policy 
driven. An IO perspective requires a precise definition in terms of distinctive elements which 
separate these industries from other industries. If such a distinction cannot be established the 
term 'creative industries' is useless for economic policy making, as no 'sectoral' policy-making 
                                                 
1 Florida and Tinagli (2004) by including all "knowledge workers" conclude that creative occupations accounted for 
approximately 30 % of all occupations in the US, approximately 25 % in some European Countries, but only to ca. 17 % for 
Austria. However, Florida's and Tinagli's (2004) definition of creative work is quite inclusive. 
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would be possible. Section 3 provides a discussion about the interrelationships between entry, 
exit and entrepreneurship from an theoretical perspective. The term of innovation is adapted 
to the cultural and creative industries. It is argued that the literature on industrial dynamics 
can provide an important element in cultural economics, although no one-to-one transfer of 
concepts is possible. Section 4 provides a more empirical oriented discussion of possible 
determinants of entry and exit in creative industries by reviewing evidence from the industrial 
organization and entrepreneurship literatures. Concluding remarks close the paper.  
 
2. The Industrial Organization of Creative Industries 
 
2.1 What industries are creative?: A brief history of the term creative 
industries 
 
The term creative industry denotes a pooling of quite heterogeneous industrial sectors. The 
analysis of creative industries from an economic perspective requires as its staring point the 
demarcation of the sector in order to associate creative activities adequately with economic 
activity. Creative industries are all industries along the value added chain related to cultural 
and artistic products and services as well as the public cultural sector.  This set of industries 
was called originally cultural industries. The term ‘cultural industries’ was born not in 
academia but in economic policy circles in the UK. In the 1980’s it was used by the Greater 
London Council (GLC) as a polemical device to emphasize that that some cultural activities 
which were outside the public funding system and operated commercially were important 
creators of wealth and employment in order to craft a economic policy to promote and to 
democratize cultural production and distribution. Thus the notion of ‘cultural industries’ 
carried from the beginning an economic and cultural policy baggage (O’Connor 1999). This 
concept was adopted by other cities in the UK but also in Germany and Australia. However, 
for many observers the juxtaposition of ‘culture’ and ‘industry’ was seen as meaningless or 
contradictory (see O'Connor 1999).  
 
The academic literature on cultural economics the focus was for a long time primarily on 
museums, ballet, opera, or orchestras, which are from an industrial organization perspective 
very similar to natural monopolies and exactly those ‘traditional’ art sectors which are heavily 
subsidized by the public hand and against which the original notion ‘cultural industries’ as 
developed by the GLC was directed. And indeed, in his survey of cultural economics Blaug 
(2001) identifies Baumol’s cost disease (e.g. Baumol and Bower, 1996) as the core of cultural 
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economics. Baumol’s cost disease is the proposition that the failure or productivity increases 
in the arts to keep pace with productivity increases in the overall economy, while wages will 
rise everywhere at an approximately same rate, necessarily implies irremediable costs 
inflation in the arts. There is considerable discussion about whether the cost disease is myth or 
reality, because the cost disease thesis emphasizes the role of process innovations for 
economic growth at the expense of product innovations (e.g. Blaug 2001: 131). Moreover, in 
the Creative industries, one can observe radical technological change leading to new products 
and processes, e.g. the impact of the internet on the music and film industry, or the invention 
of book printing on book production. This shows that there is scope for disruptive technical 
change that changes both processes and products and leads even to the establishment of new 
sectors in these industries. 
 
Cultural industries are industries whose production activities center on production of symbolic 
goods with strong copyright protections. This definition includes both ‘traditional’ arts – 
visual arts, theatre, music theatre, literature, museums, galleries etc. - and those ‘commercial’ 
arts termed by the GLC cultural industries – broadcast media, publishing, recorded music, 
architecture, new media. One can argue that contemporary art production is moving and 
oscillating between these two poles. Moreover, to an economist drawing a line between ‘art’ 
and ‘commerce’ is not analytical. Such a line is primarily an polemical device. Cowen and 
Tabarrok (2000) provide an interesting explanation of the observed increasing split between 
high and low culture (e.g. Postman 1985) in terms of increasing wealth and the pursuit of self-
satisfaction of artist versus market sales. Artists derive non-pecuniary benefits when they 
create artworks that please their own tastes. 
 
The Department of Culture, Media and Sport renamed the cultural industries creative 
industries, perhaps because of the political connotation of term cultural industries in the UK. 
Where this political connotation was largely absent, the term cultural industries was used to 
denote the same group of industries (e.g. EC 1998). In a number of countries reports about the 
development of the creative industries were compiled. This led to a new perception of the 
creative industries by policy makers. Creative industries were longer seen only through the 
lenses of cultural policy, but reconsidered also in terms of its economic weight for the 
promotion of employment and comparative advantages. Relevant research has been 
undertaken in the US and Europe. In Europe, one of  the first reports was by the European 
Commission (EC 1998). Particularly relevant was the Creative Industries Mapping Document 
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by the Creative industry Task Force, commissioned by the Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport (DCMS) in the UK (DCMS 1998, 2001). In this document creative industries were 
defined in a way that takes explicitly into account the relationship between culture and 
economic activity. Cultural industries were defined as  
 
Those activities which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and 
which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and 
exploitation of intellectual property.  
 
Thus creative industries are constituted by a group of activities ranging form the arts and 
consumer products to electronic and digital means of communication. However, if one has a 
look at the studies on creative or cultural industries, one is stunned by the disagreement on the  
definition of creative industries (e.g. see Kulturdokumentation/Mediacult/Wifo 2004, 
Creativwirtschaft austria 2004, Marcus 2005). Sometimes even the software industry is 
included (e.g. Florida 2002). Nevertheless, in all these mappings three different components 
making up the creative industries have been identified: First, economic activity directly 
related to the world of arts (visual arts, performing arts, literature and publishing, museums, 
galleries, cultural heritage etc.); second, activities related to media (press, publishing, 
broadcast industries and digital media); and third, design related activities (architecture, 
industrial design, fashion and product design). Overall, there is some tendency to consider 
cultural industries that is these industries that are traditionally associated with high arts as a 
subset of creative industries, which includes the more commercially oriented industries such 
as press, publishing and digital media (e.g. Marcus 2005).  
 
The interest on the political side is matched by the academic literature, where to some degree 
a shift of attention from the traditional arts industries of which a number share characteristics 
of natural monopolies towards industries which show more competitive market structures is 
observed. This shift of attention towards industries which are characterized by oligopolistic or 
even monopolistic competitive market structures renewed the interest into the industrial 
organization of cultural industries. Caves (2000) provides an analysis of vertical contracts of 
these industries, focused primarily on the media industries. Seaman (2004) complains that 
most of the IO literature in Cultural Economics is concentrated on the media industries, and 
that there is a neglect of analysis of horizontal market interaction and competitive interaction 
for the more traditional cultural industries, which are usually non-profit firms and act as near 
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natural monopolies. One important form of competitive interaction is the entry and exit of 
firms. 
 
 
2.2 Economic Characteristics of Creative Industries 
 
One is still left with defining the common elements that make the economic analysis of these 
industries worthwhile. The American report Copyright industries in the U.S. Economy by 
Economists Incorporated (2002) highlights the role of intangible capital and copyright 
protection in those industries. They defined as copyright industries those industries where the 
product is reproducible and protected by copyrights. Creativity is an important input for the 
production of goods and services, and difficult to protect when the output is easily 
reproducible. In fact, a unifying feature of the creative cultural and creative industries is that 
originality protected by copyright is at their core. Copyrights and trademarks are the 
appropriate protection mechanisms for creativity in these sectors, as the respective products 
are primarily artistic or literary expressions, not technical ideas as such.  
 
While some industries are prevalently competitive characterized by monopolistic and 
oligopolistic competition other segments of the cultural industries are dominated by non-profit 
firms close to natural monopolies which depend on public subsidies or even by state firms, 
especially cultural heritage. This suggests that creative industries can be very diverse, but that 
theses activities share economic properties that distinguish them from other sectors of the 
economy (Caves 2000: 2). The basic economic properties of creative industries that make 
them distinctive from other industries are: 
 
a) Products of creative industries are typically experience goods for which tastes have to be 
acquired through consumption. This makes it difficult to identify demand separately form 
supply and vice versa (Blaug 2001, p. 127). This implies that the strong form of rational 
choice theory based on constant and identical preferences put forward by Stigler and 
Becker (1977) in their important essay 'De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum' has its limits 
when it comes to the consumption of 'creative' products. The products of creative 
industries are typically 'experience goods' for which economic agents have to acquire 
tastes by a temporal process of individual learning by consumption, which may lead to 
'rational addiction'. 
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b) Beside being experience goods which refers to the individual level, products of creative 
industries are often symbolic goods, whose value is derived from cultural values, that is 
value is constructed by imitating others or the want to distinguish oneself from others. 
This is clearly visible in the case of arts. The value of art is a function of social consensus, 
where the opinion of art world insiders has greater weight. As pointed out by Shubik 
(2003, p. 195), “unlike the evaluation of many consumer goods, the problem in the 
evaluation of the worth of an art object is by far more dependent on cultural norms and 
social acceptance than the perceived needs of the consumers.” In fact, when culture is 
seen as "a signifying system through which [...] a social order is communicated, 
reproduced, experienced and explored" (Hesmondalgh, 2002: 11) then the primary activity 
of cultural activities is to generate and communicate symbolic meaning. This suggest that 
products of creative industries have often a positional character, and consumption patterns 
depend on interdependent preferences. In the economics literature there is now a rich 
literature on the adoption of positional goods, such as fine art, holiday resorts, luxury cars 
or fashion goods (e.g. Pesendorfer 1995, Swann 2001 or Reinstaller and Sanditov 2005). 
Some Authors emphasize that if the behavioral patterns of an individual are enforced or 
dampened by the behavior of peer groups, chaotic demand patterns may emerge 
(Congleton 1989, Iannaccone 1989 or Cowan, Cowan and Swann 1989). 
 
c) Due to the to elements products of creative industries differ unpredictably in the quality 
levels that consumers see in them. This induces a great uncertainty about how consumers 
will value a new creative product. This is amplified when the creative good is a complex 
product, where costs are high and to a large extent sunk, e.g. in the film industry 
(DeVaney 2003). Although creative products are experience goods, the buyer’s 
satisfaction will be a subjective reaction. Even substantial knowledge about the production 
process does not reduce the fundamental uncertainty of demand (DeVaney 2003). This 
uncertainty is associated with a short period of profitability.  
 
d) Creative industries are typically characterized by a high level of product differentiation. 
The products sold are differentiated, for example, no art work is like another. Some of the 
products are reproducible, others not. The high degree of product differentiation is linked 
to the symbolic and positional content of many cultural products and to the fact that 
cultural products contain some aspect of novelty, that is product innovation. In many 
sectors entry is unrestricted. This leads to trade-off between efficiency and diversity. The 
 8
economics literature shows that there could be easily either too much variety or not 
enough (e.g. Dixit and Stiglitz 1977). 
 
e) Most creative products are durable, in the sense that they can be used repeatedly. In fact, 
most products of creative industries beside having a symbolic meaning, embody, at least 
potentially some form of intellectual property (Thorsby 2001). In fact the expansion of the 
concept of creative industries towards the concept of creative industries does not only 
emphasize the artistic component but also the reliance on intellectual property (e.g. Caves 
2000, UNCTAD 2005). The central issue in the economics of copyrights is the same as in 
patents: balancing appropriability and accessibility, that is regulating incentives and 
distortions of supply. This leads to the trade-off between ‘productive’ and ‘reproductive’ 
fair use (Landes and Posner, 1989). If copyrights are too strong, they increase the 
(transaction) costs of creation; if they are too weak, the reduced value of copyrights 
decreases the incentives to create. Technological development such as digitalization 
created new hardware and techniques for reproducing and copying creative work. This led 
to the strengthening of copyrights in the US and in Europe following the WIPO (World 
Intellectual Property Organization) treaties on copyright and performance and 
phonograms. These treaties addressed also the digital network environment which figures 
prominently in the policy discussions on creative industries (e.g. Marcus 2005). In fact, 
copyright law can have far-reaching effects on markets in the cultural industries, including 
the encouragement or discouragement of competition through entry barriers. A number of 
commentators have argued that there is no economic justification for a further 
strengthening of copyrights, as there is only cursory evidence that stronger and longer 
copyright protection increases the provision of creative work. In addition, there is even 
less evidence available to assess possible welfare effects thereof (Towse, 2005).2 
 
f) Some industries are characterized by a specificity of technological development. Blaug 
(2001: 131) described Baumol's concept of the cost disease as the "jewel in the crown of 
cultural economics". The proposition is that the failure of technical progress in the arts to 
keep pace with technical progress in the economy as a whole, while wages nevertheless 
rise at the same rate, implies irremediable cost inflation in the cultural industries. The 
                                                 
2)  An empirical study on the effect of the Sonny Bono Act in the USA, which extended the term of copyrights on the 
author’s life plus 70 years on the movie industry concluded that it appears „to have been a giveaway to owners of existing 
creative work, while having relatively little impact on new creative activity“(Hui and Png, 2002, p. 219). For an extreme 
position against IPRs see Boldrin and Levine (2002, 2004). 
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same proposition holds also for other service industries that are labor intensive. However, 
there is considerable controversy about whether this proposition is realized. An 
implication of the cost disease is that the composition of spending has to change as larger 
proportions of income have to be spent on labor-intensive services. The cost disease is 
often used as argument that the arts need to be subsidized if they are to survive. However, 
if the composition of spending changes due to Engel's law with changes in income this 
conclusion is not warranted (Blaug 2001). 
 
g) It is often argued that the art has positive external effects and characteristics close to 
public goods, therefore public subsidies for the arts are warranted. This argumentation is 
stronger for the cultural industries that are composed of non-profit firms (or state owned 
firms in Europe) that are characterized by near natural monopolies than for competitive 
media industries. However, a large number of European countries have public subsidy 
programs for most creative industries, except perhaps those where only for-profit firms 
compete with each other. In fact, there are a number of studies that show that people are 
willing to subsidize arts even if they themselves do not consume art performances (e.g. 
Thosby and Withers 1985, West 1989). There is almost an universal consensus among 
economists in favor of public subsidies for the arts (Blaug 2001). Only some lonely voices 
argue that the cultural industries should be ruled by the market (e.g. Cowen 1998). 
However, there is substantial disagreement about the best ways of subsidizing what. There 
is a own literature on the rent-seeking activities by art lobbies which may result in 
excessive subsidies to the arts (e.g. Frey and Pommerehne 1989).3  
 
Some of these properties are more prominent in one industry, others in other industries. For 
example, while the art galleries constitute a quite competitive industry and do not show signs 
of a cost disease, opera houses operate in a near natural regional monopoly situation due to 
the high fixed costs associated with staging opera productions. The different industries 
making up creative or cultural industries are characterized by quite specific economic 
problems that govern both the horizontal and vertical industrial organization of these 
industries. Caves (2000) provides an important analysis of the vertical industrial organization 
in creative industries form the point of view of optimal contract theory. The next part we 
concentrate on entrepreneurship, entry and exit.  
                                                 
3While these considerations are especially important for the 'high' art, in an interesting contribution Romer (2002) argues that 
the two standard textbook answers that the government should provide public goods and the private sector should provide 
private goods completely misses the crucial importance of non-rival goods for modern economies. 
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 3. Entrepreneurship, innovation and competition in creative 
industries 
 
The role of business dynamics, that is the entry and exit of firms, in economic development 
was first studied in a systematic way by Schumpeter (1912). According to Schumpeter's 
theory of creative destruction, growth, innovation and business cycles are inherently 
connected and the economy develops through a process of variety generation (innovation) and 
selection (competition). Firms gain competitive advantages through innovation and by doing 
so they achieve excess profits, which encourages imitation. Formalized variants of 
Schumpeterian competition figure prominently in the new growth theories (e.g. Aghion and 
Howitt 1998, Nelson and Winter 1982). Schumpeterian competition emphasizes the entry and 
exit of firms and the contribution of technical change and research and development to 
economic growth. Large part of this literature is concerned with innovations stemming from 
research and development, thus with technical innovation. Florida (2002) claims in his 
controversial account about the rise of the 'creative economy' that in this part of the economy 
the spheres of innovation, business and culture are drawn into another, resulting in more 
powerful combinations.  
 
However, while technical innovation is central to creative industries, here the impulses come 
primarily from external research and development in other sectors. The innovation process in 
the creative industries is mostly non-technical, as these industries are typically service 
industries (e.g. digital content) and labor-intensive industries (e.g. theatres). This is also 
reflected by the fact that patents do not play an important role in creative industries. 
Copyrights and trademarks are the appropriate protection mechanisms for creativity in these 
sectors, as the respective products are primarily artistic or literary expressions, not technical 
ideas as such.  
 
The importance of non-technical innovation has increased in recent times. Non-technical 
innovation encompasses organizational innovation (e.g. particular forms of organization in 
purchasing, knowledge management, production preparation, production, distribution, etc.; 
new forms of cooperation between companies, benchmarking) and product innovation that is 
not related to technical characteristics of the product. For the creative industries, of course, 
both technical and non-technical innovation are important.  
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 The process of creating new products in the creative industries is often embedded in networks 
and clusters. Due to the relatively small size of the firms there is often a necessity to 
cooperate, and in some industries project-oriented structures are dominant (e.g. in the movie 
production in non-Hollywood firms). Knowledge-sharing is an important feature, as is the 
cumulativeness of the process of creativity.  
 
From a bird's eye perspective the Schumpeterian model certainly fits creative industries, as 
technical change revolutionized and revolutionizes creative industries. For example, taking an 
example from the prehistory of creative industries, the book industry benefited enormously 
from the invention of the printed press. This made it easy and cheap to reproduce books, 
which in turn changed consumption patterns. The invention of recording music allowed music 
fans to 'buy' the best musicians and hear high-quality music on disc, rather than hearing a live 
singer at some local concert. Those innovations not only change market structures or business 
methods, they are instrumental in creating new industries. However, the creative process 
leading to new products in the industry is substantially different from the technological and 
organizational change where improvements in productivity are a central element of the 
innovation process. In contrast to technological innovations such as book printing, which 
made the manual copying of books obsolete, there is no obsolescence of the very products of 
creative industries. For example, plays by Shakespeare or Goethe, paintings by Klimt or 
Rembrandt or records by Jimi Hendrix do not become obsolete because of new books by 
Stephen King, new paintings by Gilbert and George or new records by the Foo Fighters. Thus, 
there is a fundamental difference between technological and organizational innovation usually 
considered in the economics of technological change and artistic innovation.  
 
This suggests that the Schumpeterian model of economic growth is only appropriate for 
technological and organizational innovations. The model of increasing variety by Romer 
(1990) or the model of sectoral evolution by Saviotti and Pyka (2004) with unbalanced 
growth at the industry level seem better to fit the experience of the creative industries.  
 
Overall, entrepreneurship has become more important in the modern economies. While 
Florida (2002) talks about the creative economy, Audretsch and Thurik (2001) talk of the 
entrepreneurial economy. Audretsch and Thurik (2001) have observed a reversal of the trend 
towards large enterprises towards small and medium sized industries. They developed a 
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explanation of the reemergence of entrepreneurship in Europe and North America based on 
increased globalization, which has shifted the comparative advantage towards knowledge-
based economic activity. With knowledge as important factor of production, knowledge 
spillovers have also become more important as a source of economic growth (Romer 1986). 
Audretsch and Thurik (2001) argue that entrepreneurship is important in a knowledge 
economy because it provides a key mechanism by which knowledge created on one 
organization can be commercialized in a new enterprise. Small firms are no longer seen to be 
primarily as small firms. Jovanovic (2001) argues that entrepreneurial experimentation is 
more important in the new economy where technologies and products become obsolete at a 
much faster rate than before and that therefore "it is clear that we are entering the era of the 
young firm. The small firm will thus resume a role that, in its importance, is greater than it has 
been at any time in the last seventy years or so" (Jovanovic 2001: 55). The flow of entry and 
exit of new firms represents a changing pool of competitors. Beesley and Hamilton (1984) 
describe entry and exit dynamics as seedbed for new activities from which successful new 
firms and industries emerge. Therefore the process of entry and exit of firms serves as an 
important source of structural change in industries.  
 
Despite the popularity of the Schumpeterian concept of entrepreneurship of starting a new 
enterprise as the defining entrepreneurial activity, there is no generally accepted definition of 
entrepreneurship (OECD 1998). This failure of a single dimensioned definition of 
entrepreneurship shows that entrepreneurship is essentially a multidimensional concept 
(Peneder 2005). This is also reflected on the empirical level. Empirical research on 
entrepreneurship is variegated. This is directly related that the concept of entrepreneurship is 
difficult to operationalize for empirical measurement (e.g. Storey 1991, Peneder 2005). The 
different contexts and organizational forms involving entrepreneurship account for paucity of 
measures used to operationalize entrepreneurship. A number of studies have deployed a 
variety of proxy measures spanning from business ownership rates, self-employment rates, 
new firm startups (e.g. Reynolds et al. 2000), patents (e.g. Audretsch 1995) as well as 
measures of firm demography such as the turnover and volatility of firms (e.g. van Stel and 
Diephuis 2004). This makes clear that while entrepreneurship is a heterogeneous activity 
encompassing a broad spectrum of activities, e.g. setting up a new business, an innovation, 
introducing a new product into the market, many of the measures reflect entrepreneurship as a 
quite homogenous activity. Entrepreneurship is shaped by many factors, spanning a spectrum 
of determinants, ranging from economic to social, cultural and political ones. It is useful to 
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make the distinction between factors shaping the supply of entrepreneurship and those 
influencing the demand for entrepreneurship. The demand for entrepreneurship reflects the 
opportunities to engage in entrepreneurial activity. This is related to incentives and barriers to 
entrepreneurship at the industry and the national level. The opportunity for individuals and 
firms to engage in entrepreneurial activity is shaped by industry characteristics, characteristics 
of the individual entrepreneur and his firm, and by regional aspects. The supply of 
entrepreneurship is shaped by the characteristics of the population of potential entrepreneurs, 
their human capitals and their attitudes towards entrepreneurship.  
 
Returning to the creative industries, one can observe that not all industries in the framework 
of the creative industries are populated by small entrepreneurial firms and individuals. Some 
industries are dominated by oligopolies of large firms, e.g. recorded music and movies 
industries, while others are close to natural monopolies, e.g. opera houses or cable TV. 
However, a large part of creative industries is populated by small firms (and large firms) and 
characterized by competitive interaction, e.g. books, magazines or the performing arts.  
 
 
 
4. Determinants of Entry and Exit in Creative Industries 
 
The literature on entry and exit shows that entry and exit rates vary quite strongly across 
industries (e.g. Dunne et al. 1988, Siegfried and Evans 1994., Geroski 1995, Fotopoulos and 
Spence 1998, Carree and Thurik 1999, Hölzl and Sögner 2004). Most studies on the 
manufacturing industries emphasize barriers and incentives that influence the sectoral demand 
for entrepreneurship. For some of the industries environmental characteristics related to cost 
and demand specificities may restrict the turnover of firms and entrepreneurial ventures for 
the entire lifespan of industries. As the entry and exit of firms is closely related to 
entrepreneurship (Audretsch and Thurik 2001), we consider the determinants of entry and 
exits and the specificities of creative industries in some detail. We will discuss here three 
kinds of possible determinants that are worth to be studied. First, we consider the supply of 
entrepreneurship which is closely related to questions of the labor market in creative 
industries. It is well known that the labor market in creative industries has quite special 
features. After this we consider determinants of entry and exit from an industrial organization 
perspective, thus from the perspective of demand for entrepreneurial services. The literature 
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on entry and exit in manufacturing industries emphasizes the importance of demand and 
specificities of cost functions. Third we consider possible macroeconomic determinants of 
entry and exit. 
 
 
4.1 The artist's labor market and the entrepreneurship literature 
 
The labor market for potential entrepreneurs into creative industries is different from other 
potential entrants into other industries. McCarthy et al. (2001) and Throsby (2001) claim that 
creative labor markets have several characteristics which make it distinct from other labor 
markets. There are clear specificities in the careers of artists that make careers different from 
careers in other sectors: the degree of uncertainty in the arts is higher than in most other 
careers, consequently earnings tend to peak early and to decline quickly. Most artists leave 
their careers in the mid-thirties due to limited career opportunities. Employment is often 
sporadic and fragmented and there the industry contains a predominance of part-time workers 
and multiple job-holders (Throsby 2001). Many of the performing artists, directors, or visual 
artists and others can be considered as self-employed freelancers. In this context multiple job-
holding is a common formula to derive income. The motives for the choice of this career track 
are strongly non-pecuniary. Artists often live off wealth to finance their artistic career. Only a 
few become superstars. Consequently there are considerable differences in income 
distribution and incomes are highly skewed. However, the potential of great success provides 
critical inspiration. 
 
A number of empirical studies show that artist's labor markets are special in being invariably 
part-time and little influenced by years of schooling (e.g. Throsby 1992, Towse 1996). 
Moreover, there is ample evidence that human capital variables in earning functions are not 
that important as compared to other occupations, leading to the claim that the "human capital 
model does not apply to the arts" (Towse 1996: 308). Although specific training increases art-
related income and general education increases non-arts earnings, the evidence shows that 
formal education and training provide a small (or even negative) contribution to employment 
and earning potentials for artists (e.g. Wallsall and Alper 1992, Townse 1996, Throsby 1996, 
Karhunen 1996). A number of studies show that 'learning-on-the-job' plays a more important 
role than formal training.  
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The importance of non-pecuniary benefits ("art-as-a-way-of-life") has the consequence that 
despite the low level of wages for the large majority in the cultural and creative industries, 
there is generally an oversupply of labor. For most, the non-monetary reward of being an 
artist represents an important argument. These empirical stylized facts are reflected also in 
more formal economic theorizing. For example Cowen and Tabarrok (2000) make the 
plausible assumption that there is a discrepancy between the utility derived by artists depends 
on their own tastes. The less closely the activity is related to the core of the 'art' industries the 
less important these feature will be.  
 
In each case the individual is an important unit of observation for analyzing the determinant 
of entrepreneurship. Within the economics literature, the model of income choice is the most 
important theoretical framework. In its most basic form, individuals are confronted with a 
choice to earn income either through wages in existing firms or through profits from their 
newly started firms. The choice of income is made by comparing the wage individuals expect 
to earn through employment with the profits that are expected from entrepreneurial action. 
Khilstrom and Laffont (1979) have been expanded to incorporate risk. Most empirical tests of 
the model have focused on personal characteristics with respect to labor market conditions. 
For example, Blanchflower and Meyer (1994) emphasize human capital in the income choice. 
In the light of the previous discussion on the specificities of the labor market for artists, this 
model has some serious limitations, as artists do receive utility from making art, so that they 
end up living off wealth to be an 'entrepreneurial artist' 
 
As labor markets for artists are quite different from labor markets for plumbers, we do expect 
that the model of income choice needs to be expanded in order to account for the utility 
maximizing behavior of potential artist. To drive the point home consider the artist utility 
function used by Cowen and Tabbarok (2000): 
 
UA(c, L, s) = U(c) + V(L, s)     (1) 
 
where UA(c, L, s) is utility function of an artist. It is additively separable in consumption and 
art production, U(c) is the utility derived from consumption of goods other than art and art 
production and V(L, s) is the utility of working L units on time on art of satisfaction level s. 
The artist then maximizes UA(c, L, s) subject to the budget constraint: 
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c = wA(s) L + w(1-L) + y     (2) 
 
where wA(s) L is income from the art sector with wage wA,  w(1-L) is the income from the 
non-art sector with wage w, and y is wealth or some non-wage income. The trade-off between 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits results in the fact that artists do not generally maximize 
profits. As the utility on working on art increases with the level of satisfaction s. In 
equilibrium s will be generally higher than the market demands (Cowen and Tabbarok 2000: 
236). Artists like to shift the production of art from production for market sales toward 
production in pursuit of artist satisfaction. An implication is that the model of income choice 
needs to be expanded to take into account the non-pecuniary benefits to creative workers. 
Given this utility function, one is led to speculate on an abundance of supply in the labor 
market for cultural industries, which in turn leads to strong selection pressures. However, as 
the budget constraint (2) shows in extreme cases the income from arts could even be negative 
provided that  w(1-L) + y  is substantially larger than  wA(s) L . This allows artists to reallocate 
time to genuinely artistic activities.4 In fact several researchers have endeavored to separate 
'arts-related' earnings from 'non-art-related' earnings (e.g. Thorsby and Thompson 1994). And 
in fact, general educations exerts a strong positive effect on 'non-art-related' earnings 
(Thorsby 1996).  
 
To summarize, the labor market characteristics for artistic work are quite special as regards 
standard results for other industries. This leads to chronic excess supply, part-time and 
multiple job holdings (Wassall and Alper 1992, Thorsby 1996, Towse 1996). This has strong 
impact on the research on the supply of entrepreneurship, especially for those segments of the 
creative industries which are closest to the arts and for those where self-employment ratios are 
high.  
 
 
4.2 Barriers and incentives to entry and exit: the industrial organization 
literature 
 
The dynamics of entry and exit are quite well explored for manufacturing industries. Most of 
the empirical work concerns entry. Siegfried and Evans (1994) have classified in their 
literature survey over 70 different empirical studies on entry and exit. They distinguish 
between incentives and barriers. Table 1 presents the gist of their findings in short. The last 
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column shows the robustness of the signs associated with incentives and barriers. Table 1 
shows that for a number of variables that no conclusive evidence can be assigned on the basis 
of the results from the 70 studies.  
 
Table 1 : Classification of determinants for entry and exit 
 
Expected profits  + Incentives 
demand growth  +/~ 
cost differences - 
economies of scale ~ 
structural barriers 
multi-plant economies - 
limit pricing ~ 
excess capacity  ~ 
Barriers 
behavioral barriers 
  
product differentiation  ~ 
R&D and innovation  ~ 
Entry 
Incentives or 
Barriers  
   
low profits  + 
decline of demand  + 
Incentives 
   
sunk costs  - 
quality of management - 
Exit 
Barriers 
intangible resources 
diversification - 
Interaction between entry and exit  + 
 
Notes: based on Siegfried and Evans (1994) and Caves (1998); +,-,~  indicates a robust positive negative or a not 
robust association 
 
 
Let us consider the determinants in more detail. The inter-industry analysis of entry and exit 
has relied on the specification of the entry regression by Orr (1974). The precise specification 
has varied, the basic model of entry or exit (Shapiro and Khemani 1987) is characterized by: 
 
Entry/Exit = f(Barriers to Entry/Exit; Incentives; Interaction Entry/Exit; Controls) (3) 
 
where entry (exit) are measured typically as the number of entry (exit) or the entry (exit) rate. 
Barriers to entry/Exit is a vector and usually represented by largely time-invariant vectors of 
structural characteristics of the industry (e.g. minimum efficient scale, advertising, R&D, 
capital intensity, sunk costs etc.) that are considered to deter entry or exit. The literature on 
entry barriers emphasizes that there are market conditions that allow incumbents to raise 
prices above costs persistently without attracting entry. The distinctive element of entry 
barriers is that they create an asymmetry between incumbents and potential new entrants. 
Barriers to entry are rents derived from incumbency which impose an entry cost to entrants, 
which incumbents do not have to pay (Gilbert, 1989). Exit barriers in turn make it more 
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difficult for incumbents to exit the markets (e.g. sunk costs). A number of contributions (e.g. 
Caves and Porter, 1976; Eaton and Lipsey, 1980) have claimed that barriers to exit are related 
to barriers to entry, that is they create mobility barriers. The basic idea behind this claim is 
that exit barriers increase the costs of exit and thereby create thereby a zone of inaction where 
entrants are less likely to enter and incumbents less likely to exit. This suggests that a simple 
distinction between entry and exit barriers is not easily possible. However, this type of 
modeling has also drawbacks. Caves (1998) points out that the inclusion of concentration 
variables and price cost margins as separate regressors runs the risk of adding redundancy if 
one accepts the view proposed by the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm where 
structural characteristics constrain the number of firms in the market and lead to an 
equilibrium characterized by concentration. Structural and strategic entry barriers may also 
introduce a difficulty, insofar as they are different in one specific characteristic. Strategic 
entry barriers are essentially an ex-ante phenomenon, while structural entry barriers are both 
ex-ante and ex-post phenomena (Roberts and Thompson, 2003).  
 
The incentives vector captures changing market conditions that create opportunities for new 
entrants. Two typical variables are profits and industry growth. While the effect of the latter is 
not unambiguously to foster entry and to reduce exit, the sign of profits (usually measured) as 
price-cost margins is more ambiguous (e.g. Kessides 1990, Caves 1998, Roberts and 
Thompson 2003, Hölzl 2005), as the defense of high rents gives incumbents an incentive for 
ex-post retaliation. Knowledge, about this could lead to a situation where high profits do not 
lead to new entry. On the other hand low profits do in fact increase the likelihood of exit 
(Shapiro and Khemani 1987). 
 
The interaction entry/exit refers to the intertemporal relationship between entry and exit. 
Carree and Thurik (1996) and Roberts and Thompson (2003) provide a study of the 
interaction between entry and exit which can encompass a number of cases: (i) displacement, 
where the entry of firms leads to the exit of firms, (ii) replacement, where the exit of a firm 
opens room for the entry of new firms, (iii) demonstration, where entry leads to more entry 
via a demonstration effect, (iv) shakeout, where wave of entry is followed by a wave of exit, 
this leads to a revolving door hypothesis, where the simultaneous entry of firms leads to the 
subsequent exit of the same firms. This latter mechanism is also defined as entry into and exit 
from the competitive fringe of small firms. The empirical literature has shown that the close 
correlation between entry and exit is a stylized fact across most industries (Geroski 1995), but 
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the causation may not be unidirectional and be industry-specific. Carree and Thurik (1996) 
find evidence for displacement and replacement processes for the retailing industries in the 
Netherlands, as do Fotopoulos and Spence (1998) for Greek manufacturing industries and 
Roberts and Thompson (2003) for Polish manufacturing industries. The Controls are usually 
industry size, to accommodate differences in the number of firms in the industry.  
 
Beside industry characteristics also variables related to firm-specific characteristics can be 
included. This is usually done in order to study the post-entry performance of new firms (e.g. 
Mata and Portugal 1994, Audretsch and Mhamood 1995, Audretsch, Santarelli and Vivarelli 
1999). These studies have suggested that there is a positive relationship between plant size and 
survival (e.g. Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), Disney et al (2000)). The main explanation put 
forward for this relationship relates to the view that larger firms are more likely to have levels of 
output close to the minimum efficient scale (MES), ceteris paribus, and thus smaller firms have 
an inherent size disadvantage. While these studies generally find a positive relationship between 
size of entry and survival, Wagner (1994) finds no such relationship for German manufacturing. 
Wagner, arguing along the lines of Geroski (1991), suggests that local conditions in particular 
market niches are more likely to be important to small entrants and thus suggests that there may 
well be no significant relationship between concentration and survival. The performance of new 
firms is also conditional upon location. Fotopoulos and Louri (2000) show that location in the 
Greater Athens area increase the likelihood of survival. Colombo and Grilli (2005) show for a 
sample of Italian high-tech firms, that those firms that obtain external private equity have higher 
start-up size and therefore higher survival rates, than new entrants that are debt-financed or firms 
that are financed through founders personal savings. 
 
Turning back to the creative industries, it is easily to note that specific analyses of entry and 
exit for the creative industries are not frequent. While there are some studies on the specific 
industries (e.g. Berry and Waldfogel (1999) on the entry and exit of radio broadcasting firms) 
no cross-section or panel study on entry and exit in creative industries does exist. However, as 
Carree and Thurik (1996) note, it is also difficult to have entry studies for the service 
industries, as the data for service industries are not readily available. They emphasize that 
some of the determinants which are frequently studied for the manufacturing industries, are 
not readily available for service industries. In the creative industries the specificities of the 
vertical organization of the industries are quite important in providing incentives and barriers 
to entry (e.g. Caves 2000). However, an cross-industry study would be interesting in order to 
classify the sub-groups of creative industries. Geroski (1995) emphasizes that the only 
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industry-specific characteristic that was consistently related to entry was industry growth, 
which opens up new room for entrepreneurship. However, the number of entry is probably 
related to market size. The organizational ecology literature, points at a causal relationship 
between the number of firms and entry rates. Competition leads then to higher exit rates. A 
number of studies have shown that industry size matters for both entry and exit processes 
(Carroll and Hannan 1995, Ilmakunnas and Topi 1999). Market size is most probably 
determined by the minimum efficient size of entrepreneurial ventures in the industry, which in 
turn is related to production cost function of the activity and its transaction costs. Carree and 
Thurik (1999) call this the carrying capacity of the market.  
 
Each of the industries in the creative industries has its own specificity. In most of the creative 
industries firm size is very small (e.g. Kulturdokumentation/Mediacult/WIFO 2004), markets 
are usually segmented. An important contribution would be to engage in a classification 
exercise and to classify the industries making up the creative (cultural industries) according to 
industry-specific characteristics. Peneder (2003) provides an excellent survey of scope and 
methods of industry classification.  
 
Let us now turn to some more specific questions of entry and exit. There is now a substantial 
literature on industrial dynamics and industrial life cycles. This literature is usually centered 
on manufacturing industries. It would be interesting to know whether creative industries do fit 
the model of the industrial life-cycle or not. And if not, what characteristics do explain non-
industrial life cycle patterns? Another important question regards the issues of intellectual 
property rights and public subsidies. We provide a short discussion of these three issues in 
turn. 
 
 
Industrial dynamics and industrial life cycles  
 
According to theory of industrial life cycles (e.g. Gort and Klepper 1982, Klepper 1996, 
Agarwal and Gort 1996) entry and exit in manufacturing industries are determined by stage-
related changes in competition intensity. With more intense competition only the more 
efficient firms survive. The intensification of competition leads to more stringent entry 
barriers, more exits and less entries. This is the industry-life cycle view on industrial 
competition. Gort and Klepper (1982) tried to understand the long-term evolution of 
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innovative industries, and assessed that this long-term evolution is essentially characterized 
by a life cycle in which industries arise in their birth time, grow and mature in their 
development time, and decline in their death time. The industry life cycle clearly added value 
to the explanation of a large number of regularities occurring in innovative industries. The 
shakeout, which corresponds to a massive exit of producers, progressively became a central 
regularity to be explored in industrial dynamics. While entries are concentrated in the 
beginning of the industry-life cycle, an exit wave is associated with the maturity of the 
industry. Abernathy and Utterback (1978) and Utterback and Suarez (1993) developed an 
analysis of shakeout which is derived from the traditional Schumpeterian hypothesis on the 
R&D advantage of large firms. Jovanovic and Mc Donald (1994) propose a vision of the 
shakeout based on a technological shock, exogenous to the industry. Klepper (1996) relates 
the shakeout to the timing of entry. However, while many industries evolve according to the 
industry life cycle principles, there are a number of industries, that do not fit the story of the 
industry life cycle, Krafft (2004) emphasizes that some high-technology industries do not 
conform to the industry life cycle framework, either because they are essentially knowledge-
driven instead of technology-driven, and because they exhibit non-shakeout patterns of 
evolution. The reason for this in knowledge-driven industries is found in the crucial role of 
networks, clusters, alliances and co-operations. In fact, one might argue that a number of 
service industries do not conform industry-life cycles, and there is no real evidence for 
creative industries to follow industry life-cycle patterns, either because they share some near 
natural monopoly characteristics or because of the organization of knowledge in the industry. 
It would be interesting to know whether the more oligopolistic industries such as the movie or 
the music industries do confirm the patterns of the industrial life cycle hypothesis.  
 
 
Intellectual property rights as incentives or barriers to entry  
 
The recognition that intellectual property (IP) rights have a major influence on innovation and 
creativity has driven the recent strengthening of IP protection and enforcement. However, in 
recent times economists and other researchers have questioned the economic rationale for 
strong IP protection (e.g. Boldrin and Levine 2002, 2004). The primary economic rationale 
for intellectual property is that it encourages the development of new products and processes, 
thereby increasing social welfare. While it is common knowledge that strong property rights 
for rival goods are conducive to economic growth, for non-rival goods such as ideas, the 
economic rationale is less clear. For non-rival goods, property rights involve the trade-off 
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between incentives (appropriability) and monopoly distortions (Landes and Posner 1989, 
Romer 2002, Scotchmer 2004, Towse 2005). There is some controversy about the question 
whether intellectual property rights work primarily as incentive mechanism or whether they 
can also constitute barriers to entry and being counterproductive for innovation. 
 
The relationship between the strength of copyrights and welfare is probably non-linear. A 
very low protection would discourage creative work, to strong protection could have negative 
effects on market structure, increasing barriers to entry and to innovation due to rent-seeking 
behavior (Boldrin and Levine 2004). An example is the music and movie industry, where a 
number of observers think that extension of the copyright duration has nothing to do with 
protecting the creativity of artist but is due to the pressures of a powerful and well organized 
pressure group (Boldrin and Levine 2004). In fact the evidence by Hui and Png (2002) 
suggests that the copyright reform seems to have "been a giveaway to owners of existing 
creative work, while having relatively little impact on new creative activity“(Hui and Png, 
2002, p. 219). Towse (2005) provides a critical discussion of the extension of copyright 
protection for the creative industries and concludes that the unintended consequences of 
extending and strengthening copyright protection are not taken in consideration. One 
consequence is to increase the value of existing copyright assets which increases entry 
barriers into creative work, e.g. if creative work is cumulative or rights are held in 
monopolistic industries. This might lead to increased incentives to oligopolization and 
monopolization, with its negative effects on variety (Alexander 1994).  
 
This story is likely to be similar to the controversy about software patents, where more 
evidence is available. The controversy about software patents (strong IPR for software instead 
of the weaker protection through copyrights) stems from three interrelated issues, which are to 
some extent similar to the creative industries. First, software is the prototype of a cumulative 
technology, where incremental innovation is prevalent. The same largely holds true for the 
arts. Second, open source plays an important role in software development. This is also the 
case to some extent in creative industries, where collaboration is widespread and creativity is 
amplified by the creativity of others. Third, software is pervasive, thus is also of central 
interest to the creative industries. This shows that there are fundamental questions regarding 
the optimal design of software protection is open. From an economics point of view, the 
cumulative character of the software development process raises the question whether 
software requires different rules than standard patenting in order to provide true incentives for 
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innovation that allows follow-up invention. Theoretical research shows that in cumulative 
settings strong IPRs such as patents may be counterproductive (Scotchmer 2005, Bessen and 
Maskin, 2004) and induce wasteful rent-seeking behavior (e.g. Boldrin and Levine, 2004). 
This negative effect is mirrored by the evaluation of software patents in the US. The 
introduction of software patents in the US was characterized by low patentability 
requirements (OECD, 2004). The empirical evidence provided by Bessen and Hunt (2003) 
indicates that software patents increased from fewer than 5,000 patents a year to 20,000 
patents in 2000. This is approximately 15 % of all patents granted in the US. Interestingly, 
only a small fraction of software patents is owned by software publishers, while the vast 
majority of patents are held by large firms in the ICT, electronics, and machinery industries. 
Moreover, compared to other technological fields, a larger share of patents is held by large 
firms (Bessen and Hunt 2003). The main issue is whether software patents stifle innovation 
and facilitate anti-competitive behavior. Bessen and Hunt (2003) found that the surge in 
software patenting is primarily related to a sizeable rise in the cost effectiveness of software 
patents. They found a significant negative relationship between software patents and R&D 
intensity. This result is difficult to reconcile with the incentive theory of IPRs. 
 
 
 
Public subsidies as barriers to entry? 
 
The public sector plays an important role for the creative industries. Some of the cultural 
industries could not survive without public financing. This is associated with the fact that 
many cultural products have public goods characteristics or are meritocratic goods. For those 
industries that have a near natural monopoly characteristic barriers to entry exist simply 
because of the cost structure. In these cases entry barriers may actually increase social 
welfare. However, in other industries some specialization due to public subsidies and public 
contracting did emerge. For example the study of the Viennese creative industries 
(Kulturdokumentation/Medacult/Wifo 2004) has shown that small enterprises have 
difficulties in obtaining public contracts. Some commentators suggested that public subsidies 
do lead to the formation of art lobbies whose rent-seeking activities do discourage innovation 
and entry. The central element of public subsidies for the arts is primarily studied from a 
normative perspective, however in terms of effect on entrepreneurship the positive 
consequences of public subsidies for the arts are central.  
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4.3 Macroeconomic determinants of entrepreneurship 
 
Whether entry and exit rates vary over the business cycle is subject to considerable debate and 
the evidence is quite inconclusive. A number of industry studies find only weak influences of 
the business cycle on entry and exit. For example, Campbell (1998) found that entry rates are 
weakly (and statistically insignificantly) pro-cyclical. Exit rates, in contrast, are counter-
cyclical. Campbell (1998) explains this on the basis of a vintage capital model. In a similar 
vein, Caballero and Hammour (1994) suggest that a recession (aggregate fall in demand) will 
push the most inefficient firms out of the market. According to Caves (1998) the stage of the 
business cycle is likely to exert an important influence on the entry and exit processes.  
 
On the basis of the entrepreneurship literature the question has been investigated whether 
unemployment increases or reduces the propensity to set up a new firm. For example, Foti and 
Vivarelli (1994) find that aggregate unemployment has a positive impact on entry into self-
employment in Italy. This is related to a “recession push” scenario, which implies higher 
gross entry and gross exit in economic downturns. The plausibility of this scenario is related 
to the observation that during phases of increasing cyclical unemployment, individuals are 
“pushed” into an entrepreneurial role (e.g. Storey 1991, Pfeiffer and Reize 2000). The 
standard argument to start-up a business from unemployment is that the opportunity cost of 
self-employment declines when becoming unemployed. Sögner (2005) finds that entry rates 
growth rates significantly depend on the growth rates of the real gross domestic product and 
unemployment. 
 
In contrast, Ritsila and Tervo (2002) have found no influence of the national unemployment 
rate on new firm formation in Finland, however they find a positive relationship between 
individual unemployment and self-employment. Fotopoulos and Spence (1997) argued that 
nearly every conceivable outcome in terms of the sign can be expected at the industry level, 
depending also on the specificities of the industries. Those industries, where setting up a new 
business is comparably cheap (self-employment) are much more likely to experience a 
recession-push than industries with high entry barriers. For the latter industries one would 
expect a "expansion-pull" scenario. 
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As creative industries are quite variegated, it would be interesting to know, whether some of 
the industries experience a recession-push or a expansion-push. However, we expect that the 
specificities of labor markets for creative industries, described in section 4.1 are relevant for 
the effect of macroeconomic variables on the entry into and the exit from creative industries.  
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper presents an exploratory survey on entrepreneurship, entry and exit in creative 
(cultural) industries. While the definition of creative (cultural) industries is not entirely 
straightforward, these industries share a number of specific characteristics that make them 
similar and worth of economic analysis, even if there is quite some heterogeneity across these 
industries. Exactly this heterogeneity provides opportunities to study entrepreneurship in 
different settings, especially as regards the classification of the industries making up the 
creative and cultural industries. 
 
The specificities of the creative industries include the centrality of considerations of 
intellectual property rights on the incentives to set up firms and considerations related to the 
public sector interaction through subsidies. However, the most important difference between 
creative and manufacturing industries is found in the labor market for the creative industries, 
which values training on the job much more than formal education. Given the attention policy 
makers direct towards the creative industries, the study of entrepreneurship, entry and exit and 
its determinants from an industrial organization perspective is needed. 
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